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Abstract
We present a scheme for key distribution based on bi-partite correlation of single photons. Alice
keeps an ancilla photon and sends a signal photon to Bob, where intrinsic bi-partite correlation
of these photons is obtained through first order intensity correlation in their detectors. The key
bits are distributed through sharing four bi-partite correlation functions and photon counting. The
scheme consists of two parts; first, Alice prepares deterministic photon states and Bob measures the
photon states based on his random choice on correlation functions. Second, Alice guesses Bob’s
choice of correlation functions and sets the key bits by sending out photon states. Bob verifies
the key bits through the photon states regardless Alice made a right or wrong guess. We called
this key distribution scheme as prepare-measure-guess-verify (PMGV) protocol. We discuss the
protocol by using a highly attenuated laser light, and then point out the advantages of using a fiber
based correlated photon-pair to achieve better performance in security, communication distance
and success rate of key distribution.
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Superposition and entanglement are essential in developing quantum information tech-
nologies for real world applications especially for secure communication with quantum key
distribution (QKD) [1, 2]. QKD has been securely implemented in an optical free-space
link (144 km) with polarization entangled photon-pair [3] and an optical fiber network (45
km) with six different protocols [4]. The BB84 and B92 protocols [5, 6] are secure against
photon number splitting attack (PNS). This attack is only a threat if Alice and Bob shared a
fake single-photon source such as using a highly attenuated laser light. To overcome photon
number splitting attack (PNS) [7, 8] due to the use of highly attenuated laser light in a lossy
long channel, decoy-state protocols [9–11] and SARG04 protocol [12] have been proposed and
implemented. Measurement-device-independent QKD [13] is recently proposed to enhance
secure communication against all detector side channel attacks and double communication
distance by using highly attenuated laser light. The approach requires coincidence detection
of a signal pulse from Alice and a reference pulse from Bob. In this work, we propose a
QKD scheme based on single photon bi-partite correlation.
Correlation functions or expectation values of two observable are classical information
as a consequence of the collapse of wave functions in a measurement process. Correlation
functions of two Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) entangled photons are obtained through
nonlocal interferences of their probability amplitudes at two observers. The quantumness of
these interferences is the exhibition of particle-wave duality. The quantum mechanics with-
out probability amplitude was proposed [14], leading to the possibility of quantum infor-
mation processing without probability amplitudes, that is, quantum information processing
with correlation functions.
Bi-partite correlation of coherent light state has been observed by wave mechanical in-
terferences of electromagnetic light fields with different modulated frequencies [15, 16]. By
post-selecting a pair or multiple pairs of beat frequencies from detectors, the bi-partite or
multiple-partite correlation functions were obtained for simulating the violation of Bell’s in-
equalities [17] and the locality of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) entanglement [18, 19].
Recently, a coherent light field and a random phase-modulated noise field was used to gen-
erate the optical bi-partite correlation without applying any post-selecting techniques [20].
Instead, the correlation was obtained through mean-value measurement of the multiplied
random beat signals of two observers. The experiment showed that the phases information
between two observers was not diminished in the presence of random noises. We further
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interrogated the generation of bi-partite correlation by using two weak coherent states in
balanced homodyne detection [21], where quantum noises, shot noises and electronic noises
were included in the measurement process. These noises were used to protect the phases in-
formation between two observers. Bits correlations were then extracted from the correlation
functions.
In this paper, we present a new protocol for key distribution by using single photon bi-
partite correlation. The security of the protocol is protected by the principle of quantum
mechanics such as quantum non-cloning theorem, superposition and entanglement. We
use four bi-partite correlations to distribute key between Alice and Bob. Our protocol is
relied on interference of single photons, i.e., the first order intensity correlation of an ancilla
photon in Alice and a signal photon in Bob. These single photons have to be intrinsically
correlated through a highly attenuated laser light or a photon-pair source. We will first
discuss the protocol by using single photons (ancilla and signal) prepared from a highly
attenuated laser light. Our protocol requires coincidence detection of ancilla photon and
signal photon. We then discuss the use of a fiber based correlated photon-pair or two
time-synchronized deterministic single-photon sources for improving the success rate of key
distribution and increasing the communication distance by factor two in comparison to the
use of a highly attenuated laser light. The correlated photon-pair is easy-to-use and more
tolerant to decoherence compared to an entangled photon-pair. The essence of the paper is
to propose a new scheme for key distribution based on single photon bi-partite correlation.
Secure communication between Alice and Bob is established through four types of bi-partite
correlation functions (C1, C2, C3, C4), which can be divided into two groups (Ψ,Φ). Alice
first prepares a sequence of deterministic states, Bob measures each photon state randomly
based on his random choice on C1, C2, C3, or C4 and then tells Alice through classical
channel about the sequence of groups (Ψ,Φ) that he has randomly chosen. Alice guesses the
correlation based on the group information and sets the key bit by sending another signal
photon to Bob. Bob verifies the key bit by the outcome of his measurement regardless
Alice made a right or wrong guess. We called this scheme as prepare-measure-guess-verify
(PMGV) protocol.
The proposed experiment setup is shown in Fig.1. A pulsed, 45◦-polarized laser light is
used to provide a coherent state with large mean photon number per pulse. The coherent
state is split by a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) into a coherent state |α〉H = ||α|eiφα〉
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FIG. 1: The experiment scheme for implementing key distribution using a signal photon and an
ancilla photon. Also shown is the use of a fiber based correlated photon-pair as photon source to
replace the highly attenuated laser light. The dotted box is the wave plates used for preparing
bi-partite correlation between Alice and Bob.
with horizontal polarization and a coherent state |β〉V = ||β|eiφβ〉 with vertical polarization.
These coherent states are combined through a beam splitter (BS1), producing two spatially
separated beams, i.e, beam 1 and beam 2 at each output of the BS1. Beam 1 is sent to Bob
and the other beam 2 is kept by Alice. To create single photon quantum channel between
Alice and Bob, the beam 1 is attenuated to single photon level, i.e., the mean photon number
per pulse less than 1. The single photon sent to Bob in the quantum channel is called signal
photon. The signal photon is inherited from the superposition of |α〉H + |β〉V or two paths
before the BS1, where the relative phase (φβ−φα) = −90◦ is locked through beam 2 at Alice.
Similarly, the beam 2 is further attenuated to single photon level. The single photon kept
in Alice is called ancilla photon. The ancilla photon in Alice and the signal photon in Bob
are intrinsically correlated in the laser and phase-locked through the phase-locking circuit
at (φβ − φα) = −90◦. Then, the bi-partite correlation between these photons is obtained by
using wave plates in Alice and Bob as shown in the dotted boxes in Fig.1. In the our previous
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FIG. 2: The definition of the group (ψ, φ), settings of θ1 and θ2 for maximum correlation, the
interference signals at Alice and Bob for which detector will fire for all four types of bi-partite
correlations C1, C2, C3 and C4.
work [21], we have verified four types of bi-partite correlation functions C1 = −cos2(θ1−θ2),
C2 = +cos2(θ1+θ2), C3 = −cos2(θ1+θ2), and C4 = +cos2(θ1−θ2) through the combination
of wave plates as shown in the inset of Fig.1. The half-wave plates(HWP3 and HWP5) before
the polarizing beam splitters (PBS1 and PBS2) in Alice and Bob are used for projecting
polarization angles θ1 and θ2 so that maximum correlation, i.e., C1,2,3,4 = ±1 is obtained. In
the following discussion, let’s assume that an ancilla photon and a signal photon are available
at the same time slots. We denote ′+′ and ′−′ for these photons passed through and reflected
from their PBSs. If the single photon detector (SPD) ′+′ or ′−′ detects a photon, then we
encode the valid detection as bit ′1′ or bit ′0′, respectively. For each correlation function,
Alice and Bob can control their photons to be in the ′+′ or ′−′ port of their PBSs by using
their HWPs. We need to choose the best settings for their HWPs so that we could obtain
maximum correlations of their photons and also distribute the key effectively.
We illustrate each bi-partite correlation function and the optimum settings of θ1 and θ2
in Fig.2. For the correlation function C1 = −cos2(θ1 − θ2), Alice and Bob receive their
photons with interference terms as given by +Cos(2θ1 + (φβ − φα)) and −Cos(2θ2 + (φβ −
φα)), respectively. By projecting the HWP5 in Alice at θ1 = +45
◦ and also the HWP3
in Bob at θ2 = +45
◦, we have C1=-1 indicating maximum anti-correlation between Alice
and Bob. This can be easily noticed with the help of phase-locking (φβ − φα) = −90◦,
the interference term in Alice, +Cos(2(+45◦) + (φβ − φα)) → ′+′ and interference term
in Bob, −Cos(2(+45◦) + (φβ − φα)) → ′−′. This implies that the ancilla photon in Alice
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FIG. 3: Conceptual prepare-measure-guess-verify protocol for key distribution based on single
photon bi-partite correlation.
passed through the PBS2 and detected by the ′+′ SPD3, and also the signal photon in Bob
is reflected from the PBS1 and detected by the ′−′ SPD2. For the correlation function,
C2 = +cos2(θ1+ θ2), the maximum correlation C2=+1 is obtained by projecting θ1 = +45
◦
and θ2 = −45◦. Alice has the same interference term, but Bob has the interference term
+Cos(2θ2 − (φβ − φα)) → +Cos(2(−45◦) − (−90◦)) → ′+′. As a result, both the ′+′
SPD3 in Alice and the ′+′ SPD1 in Bob will detect a photon. For the correlation function,
C3 = −cos2(θ1+ θ2), we still project θ1 = +45◦ and θ2 = −45◦ for the maximum correlation
C3=-1. Alice’s ′+′ SPD3 still see her ancilla photon. While Bob has the interference term
−Cos(2θ2 − (φβ − φα)) → −Cos(2(−45◦) − (−90◦)) → ′−′, and so the ′−′ SPD2 will see
his signal photon. For the correlation function, C4 = +cos2(θ1 − θ2), the θ1 = +45◦ and
the θ2 = +45
◦ are used for the maximum correlation C4=1. Similarly, Alice will see her
ancilla photon in the ’+’ SPD3. Bob has the interference term +Cos(2θ2 + (φβ − φα)) →
+Cos(2(45◦) + (−90◦)) →′ +′. The ’+’ SPD1 in Bob will detect a photon. For all four
bi-partite correlations, Alice will have her ancilla photon in the ’+’ SPD3. Alice uses this
valid detection for preparing the signal photon that sent to Bob. We will divide the four
bi-partite correlations into two groups, C1,C2 → Ψ and C3,C4 → Φ.
Now, let’s discuss the protocol of key distribution between Alice and Bob using the shared
correlation function as shown in Fig.3. The scheme can be divided into two parts; the first
part is Prepare-Measure (PM) part and the second part is Guess-Verify (GV). In the PM
part, Alice prepares an ancilla photon for herself and also a signal photon to be sent to
Bob. First, Alice has to verify her ancilla photon is always bit ′1′ or detected by the ′+′
SPD3 as discussed before in Fig.2, so that the signal photon sent to Bob is phase-locked,
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i.e, the relative phase between the horizontal and vertical components of the signal photon
is kept constant. From here, we assume that Alice only prepares bit ′1′ and sends the bit
information to Bob through the signal photon. Bob can randomly choose one of the four
C1, C2, C3, and C4 correlation functions by means of randomly projecting the HWP1 and
QWP2 as shown in the inset of Fig.1. If Bob chooses C1, his ′−′ SPD2 will ’click’ as shown
in Fig.2 and then he encoded the detection as bit ′0′. Similarly, if Bob chooses C2 or C3 or
C4, he will have bit ′1′ or ′0′ or ′1′, respectively. Bob can randomly generate the key by his
choice of correlation functions. However, the key is not shared with Alice. Fig.2. shows the
expected bit correlation for each correlation between Alice and Bob in the PM part.
In the guess-verify (GV) part, Bob has to tell Alice about which group (Ψ,Φ) of his
choice by using a classical channel. Since each group of (Ψ,Φ) has two choices of correlation
functions, Alice has to guess one of two correlations within the group. No matter Alice’s
guess of Bob’s choice of correlation is right or wrong, Alice will use her guess of correlation
to generate the key bit. For example, Bob tells Alice that he used the group Ψ, Alice
can chooses C1 or C2. If Alice choose C1 (C2), she will generate bit ′1′(′0′) as her key
bit. In order for Alice to do that, she has to use the HWP1 and the QWP2 as shown
in the dotted box in Bob’s setup in Fig.1. In the GV part, Alice is mimicking the Bob’s
apparatus and generating the key bit based on her guess. She send the signal photon
to Bob. Bob will use the QWP4 at +45◦ to replace the HWP1 and the QWP2 in his
setup. However, Bob must keep the setting of the HWP3 (+45◦,−45◦) for his choice of
correlation function that he has chosen in PM part. The sequence of the HWP3 angles will
be used to verify the key bit sent by Alice. The essence of this verify part is Bob only (not
Alice and Eve) knows his HWP3 angles. Bob can find out the key generated by Alice’s
guess by detecting the signal photon in the ′+′ SPD1 (’Yes’/right guess) or the ′−′ SPD2
(’No’/wrong guess). To implement the GV part, Alice and Bob must keep their HWP angles
(θ1 = +45
◦,+45◦,+45◦,+45◦; θ2 = +45
◦,−45◦,−45◦,+45◦) for the correlation function C1,
C2, C3 and C4, respectively. Since Alice and Bob have swapped their correlation preparation
(HWP1+QWP2⇔ QWP4) and kept their projection angles (HWP3 and HWP5), Alice has
to shift the phase-locked mode to φβ − φα = 90◦ for her guess on the correlation functions
C2 and C3. The reason is for the correlation functions C2 and C3, Alice will have the
interference terms in the cosine function changed from +(φβ − φα))→ −(φβ − φα)).
We illustrate the guess-verify part in more detail in Fig.4 about how Bob knows Alice’s
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FIG. 4: The guess-verify part showing how Bob knows Alice’s guess is right or wrong for his choice
of correlation in the prepare-measure part. .
guess is right or wrong. For the correlation function C1, Alice and Bob keep their projection
angles θ1 = +45
◦ and θ2 = +45
◦ that they used in the prepare-measure part. If Alice’s
guess on C1 is correct through the group information Ψ sent by Bob where Bob did choose
the C1 for his choice, the interference term in Alice −cos(2θ1 + (φβ − φα))) → −1, i.e.,
bit ′0′ or the ′−′ SPD4 will detect the ancilla photon. While the interference term in Bob
+cos(2θ2 + (φβ − φα)))→ +1, i.e., the ′+′ SPD1 will detect the signal photon which means
’Yes’, so Bob knows that Alice has guessed the right correlation function C1 and hence the
bit ′0′ for the key bit. Now, if Alice guessed C2 instead of C1, so her guess is wrong. The
interference term in Alice +cos(2θ1 − (φβ − φα))) → +1 or bit ′1′. Note that Alice has to
apply the phase shift φβ−φα = +90◦ for her guess on C2 and C3 as discussed above. While
the interference term in Bob +cos(2θ2+(φβ−φα)))→ −1 or the ′−′ SPD2 will ’click’ which
means ’No’, so Bob knows Alice has guessed the wrong correlation or bit. From here, Bob
knows the key bit set by Alice regardless Alice’ guess is right or wrong. Similarly, Bob knows
Alice’s guess for the other correlation functions C2, C3 and C4 in the guess-verify part as
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FIG. 5: The scheme for key distribution between Alice and Bob.
illustrated in Fig.4.
To illustrate the PMGV protocol more systematically, we will discuss an example of the
key distribution as shown in Fig.5. Step 1-4 is for the PM part and Step 5-9 is for the GV
part. Step 1: Alice sends a phase-locked signal photon to Bob by making sure the ancilla
photon is detected in her ′+′ SPD3 or bit ′1′. Alice kept the projection angle θ1 = +45
◦. Step
2: Bob measures the signal photon based on his random choice of correlation function. He
chooses C3, C1, C4 and C2 and keeps the projection angle θ2 for each correlation function.
Step 3: He obtains bit ′0′, ′0′, ′1′, and ′1′, respectively, according to Fig.2. Step 4: Bob
tells Alice through classical channel about the group of his choice (Φ,Ψ), not revealing his
choice of correlation function. Step 5: Alice makes guess based on which group information.
Alice guesses C4, C1, C3, and C2. Step 6: Alice uses the projection angle she kept in Step
1. She measures the ancilla photon and obtains the bit ′1′, ′0′, ′0′, and ′1′ as her key bit.
Step 7: Bob measures the signal photon prepared by Alice’s guess by using the sequence of
projection angle θ2 he kept in Step 2. Bob knows whether Alice’s guess is right (’Yes’) or
wrong (’No’) as illustrated in Fig.4. Step 8a: Bob knows the key bits that Alice set based
on her guess even though Alice’s guess was wrong. Steps 8b and Step 9 are the alternative
of Step 8a in the case Bob did not receive the signal photon sent by Alice. Step 8b: Bob
tells Alice about his valid detection. The ’x’ means no valid detection and the ’
√
’ means
valid detection. Step 9: Bob and Alice shared the remain bits as their raw secret key.
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This protocol is based on the bi-partite correlation function generated through the in-
terference of the ancilla photon in Alice and the interference of the signal photon in Bob.
These interferences are spatially separated but their phases are intrinsically correlated in
the laser. Since the signal photon is prepared from a highly attenuated laser light, the
protocol is still vulnerable to PNS attack. The protocol is secure against PNS attack if a
correlated photon-pair is used as a photon source for replacing the highly attenuated laser
light. The correlated photon-pair is much easier to generate and less sensitive to decoherence
than an entangled photon-pair. The high purity of correlated photon-pair at the telecom
wavelengths can be generated through a four wave mixing process in a 300 m dispersion-
shifted fiber (DSF). The coincidence to accidental coincidence ratio (CAR) > 100 has been
achieved by suppressing the spontaneous Raman scattering process in a DSF cooled at the
liquid nitrogen temperature 77K [24]. In the four wave mixing process, two pumps photon
are annihilated to create energy-time correlated signal-idler photon pair. The signal and
idler photons are separated from the pump photons by using a cascaded wavelength division
multiplexing (WDM). The signal photon is projected to left circular polarization and sent
to Bob. Similarly, the idler photon is projected to right circular polarization and sent to
Alice. The right and left circular polarizations of idler/signal photons are analog to the
phase-locked ancilla and signal photons when the highly attenuated laser light is used. In
the guess-verify part, the polarizations of idler/signal photons are exchanged to right ⇀↽ left
for the correlation functions C2 and C3.
Since our protocol requires coincidence detection of ancilla photon and signal photon,
the highly attenuated laser light can provide the success rate of key distribution as given by
nans, where na and ns are mean photon number per pulse for the ancilla and signal photons.
As for the use of a fiber based correlated photon-pair, the protocol is complete secure against
PNS attack. The success rate for the key distribution is given by the production rate of the
photon-pair per pulse, npr. A cooled dispersion-shifted fiber at liquid nitrogen temperature
(77K) can provide the purity of photon-pair with CAR > 100 at photon-pair production
rate of 0.01 per pulse. For example, if we use the commercial available (u2t) fiber mode-
locked laser at repetition rate of 10 GHz [25] and a high speed low dark count super-
conducting single photon detector, we will obtain raw secret key bits about 0.01 × 109 ×
0.01(total detection efficiency) ∼ 105 key bits. After applying private amplification and
information reconciliation protocols, we predict to obtain about 25000 secret key bits. If a
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highly attenuated laser light is used to prepare the nans = 0.01 per pulse for both ancilla
and signal, we can have the same performance as discussed above. In ideal case, the best
performance of this protocol can be achieved by replacing highly attenuated laser light or
photon-pair source with two time-synchronized deterministic single photon sources, where
the nans = npr = 1.0 per pulse. It is worth to note that the photon-pair source and two
single-photon sources can increase distance of communication between two parties by factor
of two.
In conclusion, we have proposed a prepare-measure-guess-verify (PMGV) protocol for key
distribution using four types of single photon bi-partite correlation functions between two
parties. We show that the PMGV protocol can be implemented with a highly attenuated
laser light source, which is often used as alternative single photon source. Since the protocol
requires coincidence detection of an ancilla photon and a signal photon, any photon-pair
source or two single-photon sources can improve the success rate of key distribution, the
security against PNS attack and double the communication distance in comparison to the
use of highly attenuated laser light.
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